With use of innovative proxies and new annual data, I demonstrate that relatively high legal capacity and regulatory activity of the early-modern Polish parliament was positively associated with deeper commodity market integration. Conversely, the lack of effective law-making, caused by the right of a single delegate to discontinue the parliamentary sessions, fostered market fragmentation. This indicates that early parliamentary regimes might have required legal capacity to harmonize domestic institutions and reduce the transaction costs. The Polish case suggests a hypothesis that the pre-1800 'Little Divergence' between European parliamentary regimes could potentially be partially explained by differences in their capacities.
INTRODUCTION What factors allowed certain regions of Europe to develop their market economies early on and what
were the reasons for the relative stagnation of the less successful areas? Specifically, what was the role of the early-modern transition from feudalism to semi-centralised and relatively powerful territorial states in setting the stage for modern economic growth? Political institutions are critical determinants of prosperity (e.g. Acemoglu & Robinson 2012) . Many scholars identify the parliamentary form of governance and the rule-of-law as preconditions for the market economy (e.g. North & Weingast 1989 ).
The 'Little Divergence' in pre-1800 economic development between England/Britain, the Netherlands, and the rest of Europe is often linked to the formation of territorial parliamentary regimes in the two successful countries (e.g. Van Zanden et al. 2012; Broadberry and Wallis 2017) . The available GDP evidence suggests that both the British Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Dutch Act of Abjuration of 1581 were followed by long periods of sustained economic growth. However, not all parliamentary regimes prospered. For example, the available GDP evidence shows that both the transition of Poland into a parliamentary republic in the 16 th century (this will be discussed in detail) as well as the change from absolutism to a parliamentary form of government in Sweden in 1718, were followed by protracted economic decline (Bolt & Van Zanden 2014; Malinowski & Van Zanden 2017) . The fact that not all preindustrial parliamentary regimes succeeded economically demonstrates that the consolidation of power around a parliament is an insufficient condition for sustained economic growth.
Why did some pre-industrial parliamentary regimes prosper while others did not? According to Besley and Persson (2011) , a state can promote prosperity only if it possesses (1) legal capacity denoting the authority and infrastructure to create and enforce the law and (2) fiscal capacity representing the means to finance its operations. With this study, I contribute to the growing literature on the role of centralisation and state capacity in promoting economic growth and market development before 1800 (Bonney 1995; O'Brien 2011; Chilosi et al. 2018; Dincecco & Katz 2016; Dimitruk 2018; Epstein 2001; Johnson & Koyama 2017) . I complement the earlier studies that predominantly focused on fiscal capacity with an original study of the impact of legal capacity. Specifically, I analyse the role that the Polish Diet played in developing an integrated domestic commodity market.
Early modern Poland is uniquely suited to study the economic impact of the parliamentary regime. In the 16 th century, Poland both limited the authority of the king and experienced, in relative terms, a golden age of political centralisation under a strong parliament, the Seym. At the time, the Polish(-Lithuanian) Commonwealth became the biggest state in Europe covering the territories of present-day Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, and Belarus. The Seym issued numerous regulations that began to change and unify the dissimilar, historical, regional, economic institutions across this vast country. In the mid-17 th century, a constitutional conflict over the mode of royal election led to the introduction of the liberum veto -the right of a single delegate to discontinue the Seym's proceedings and nullify its decisions (this will be discussed in detail). The veto was used to prevent any further constitutional change. Moreover, by bribing the delegates to the parliament, Prussia, Austria, and Russia made frequent use of the veto to abort the Seym's sessions and weaken the Polish state. This led to a lack of effective lawmaking at the central level of the state (see the regulatory output in Figure   6 ). This 'historical experiment' offers a rare opportunity to test if legal capacity and regulatory output of central institutions of governance stimulated pre-1800 market integration. Relying on the research of successful historical England/Britain and the Dutch Republic is insufficient to falsify the hypothesis that strong parliamentary regimes promoted markets.
In this article, I use the historical record to understand how the gradual weakening of the Polish state between the formation of the country's parliamentary system in 1505 to the first partition of the country by its neighbours in 1772 affected the integration of the domestic rye market. I link the relevant literature on state capacity, parliamentarism, and market integration. I propose a model of the relationships between fragmentation, centralisation and market integration, based on Stephen Epstein's (2001) earlier formulation. Epstein provided empirical support for his claim that political centralisation fostered commodity market integration with a study of price volatility. I provide further backing for this hypothesis with a comprehensive study of price convergence. To my knowledge, I am the first to identify a correlation between proxies of legal capacity of central state institutions and grain market integration for as early as the pre-industrial period and trace the relationship for nearly three centuries. Van Zanden et al. (2012) proposed to proxy the involvement of an early modern parliament by counting how many days it was in session each year. I present new data on the number of days the Polish Diet was in session each year. I complement this measure of legal capacity with an innovative new index of the Seym's regulatory output based on an original study of its acts. I show that the right of individual delegates to abort the Seym's sessions led to a lack of effective lawmaking. I demonstrate, that the use of vetoes was not driven by the market conditions but linked to the conflict over the mode of royal election. I discuss via which historical mechanisms, when active, the Diet and its regulations promoted market integration and how its inactivity rose the exchange costs. With the use of regression analysis, I
identify that both (1) the number of days the Seym was in session and (2) its regulatory output stimulated price convergence. Moreover, I study the individual impact of various types of regulation. I provide evidence that the Seym lowered the exchange costs on the market by harmonising taxes and measures.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Various studies measured the extent of market integration in preindustrial Europe (e.g. Bateman 2011; Chilosi et al. 2013; Chilosi et al. 2018; Frederico 2012; Malinowski 2016a; Shiue and Keller 2007) . The results yield that, after a period of medieval disintegration, markets only became effectively integrated in the 19 th century. However, the literature also identifies that there were numerous incidents of greater integration that, due to the lack of significant changes in the modes of land transportation in the earlymodern era, cannot be simply explained by technological advancements. This suggests institutions played a crucial role in the process of pre-industrial market integration (Uebele 2013). In this article, I
use the Polish case to argue that high legal capacity and regulatory activity of a territorial parliament promoted intra-regional domestic commodity market integration. I set up the theoretical framework in two steps. First, I present a general perspective on the subject -I link three established theoretical viewpoints: (1) the impact of state formation/political centralisation on market integration put forward by Stephen Epstein; (2) the benefits of the parliamentary regime postulated by Douglass North and his followers, and (3) the importance of state capacity propagated, among others, by Tim Basley. Second, I
define the exact mechanisms of interest; I put forward a functional model of exchange costs based on Epstein's (2001) earlier formulation (Table 1) . The model motivates subsequent empirical analysis.
1) Conceptual framework
In Early Modern Europe, the formation of territorial states gradually replaced the feudal, medieval, political fragmentation with the centralization of authority defined here as the power to give orders, make decisions, and enforce obedience by the central government. The government consolidated the power that used to be held by regional lords and assemblies which led to an increase in taxation and topdown regulation. The central authority had not yet been divided between executive, legislative, and judiciary branches; instead, the power was shared between kings and parliaments and its balance determined whether regimes were more absolutist or parliamentary. Johnson and Mark Koyama (2017) .
Did this progressing centralisation and increase in state capacity result in the formation of more integrated domestic markets? According to Epstein (2001, p.30) , "the principal reason why pre-modern (…) productivity experienced frequent setbacks, was the high level of transaction costs in pre-modern societies due to political fragmentation, coordination failures, and upheaval and warfare". Epstein (2001, p.32) argued that "state formation lowered pre-existing seigniorial dues, overcame co-ordination failures (prisoners' dilemmas) between rival feudal and urban monopolies, systematized legal codes, weights and measures, and reduced the ruler's opportunities and incentives to act autocratically as a 'stationary bandit' against his subjects. State formation was thus a major cause -possibly the major cause -of market integration and Smithian growth". In the same vein, according to Stephen Broadberry and Joseph Wallis (2017) , the creation of uniform impersonal rules by the state was essential for market development. Conversely, weak central authority transferred the power to the local elites who benefited from institutional differences and personalised privileges. Similarly, Johnson and Koyama (2017) argued that centralised and strong governments of early modern France and Prussia managed to suppress the attempts by local elites to extract rents by which they decreased exchange costs on the domestic market. The negative effects of tax predation and political fragmentation were identified by Mark Dincecco (2010) . Conversely, Chilosi et al. (2018) demonstrated that the semi-centralised Holy Roman
Empire promoted capital market integration better than more fragmented Italian polities. On the other hand, it has been argued that political and institutional fragmentation provided economic actors with exit options and therefore forced competition between different institutional technologies that fostered their development (compare Tilly 1990; Cox 2017) . Epstein (2000) argued that both absolutist and parliamentary regimes could achieve centralisation of institutions and harmonisation of laws. The literature advocates that parliamentary regimes that constrained the executive but still provided order are superior to those that left the king unconstrained. According to Douglass North and Barry Weingast (1989) , the Glorious Revolution in England (1688) limited the extractive potential of the rulers and fostered protection of property rights that inspired investment and innovation (see also Van Zanden et al. 2012) . The authors see impersonal market institutions as a necessary condition for economic development (North & Weingast 1989, p. 831 The idea that the centralisation of power around a parliament should lead to economic development has been criticised, among other reasons, because a parliament could be used to create extractive rents for the elite (Barro 1997; North et al. 2009; Ogilvie & Carus 2014 The Seym was used to create country-wide rents for the nobility (e.g. tax exemptions or the sole right to own the land). However, the nobility was interested in the free, inexpensive, effective movement of grain from their land, across the country, to major ports and cities (Rybarski 2015) . At the same time, the local elites had an incentive to free-ride on the free (commodity) market by creating local rents (e.g. tolls, see subsequent section). The market faced a 'tragedy of the commons'; by following their individual interest individual landowners opposed the common interest of the nobility. Concerning Polish grain trade, like in the Epstein's model, the opposition was between individual, regional, rent-seeking particularism and central universalism.
promote growth while others did not (see Johnson & Koyama 2017) . Figure 1 proposes a convenient summary of the aforementioned key ideas. 2) The model Regarding the fixed factors, I distinguish between (1) the physical distance that a good had to be moved and (2) differences/similarities in languages and culture between localities that either facilitated or hampered the exchange. Regarding the exogenous factors, I highlight the importance of (3) climate and weather conditions that, among others, affected the agricultural output/economies of scale and the quality of the trade routes (e.g. prevalence of mud or snow) and (4) interstate warfare. For simplicity, I
assume that, especially in the short term, the likelihood of a country being involved in a trade-disrupting, interstate, military conflict was independent of the country's legal and fiscal capacity but driven by exogenous international politics (compare Tilly 1990).
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Regarding the market forces, I build on the general factors discussed by Van Tielhof (2002) and Bochove (2008) in their respective studies of the trade. In particular, I assume that transportation costs mainly depended on the (5) wages that were paid to the people who handled the grain and the (6) costs of capital goods such as the cart, raft, or horses used in transportation.
3 Moreover, transaction costs were influenced by the (7) cost of obtaining credit and the (8) cost of storage. 4 Lastly, the value of the currency was influenced by (9) its purchasing power (for discussion see Van Tielhof 2002) .
The last two groups of factors concern the role of centralisation/fragmentation and state capacity. Based on North (1981) , Epstein (2001) argued that the exchange costs were a function of the clarity of the 'rules-of-the-game'. Ineffective central governance shifted the power to the regional level and promoted feudal-type jurisdictional fragmentation that encouraged regional rent-seeking and institutional differentiation. According to Epstein (2001, p.32) , "the cost of trade was defined mainly by institutional regulation and tariffs." Regarding transportation costs, the high legal capacity of central state institutions lowered the exchange costs by monopolising the right to collect tariffs. This opposed the incentive of regional landowning elites to, for example, introduce tolls on their private land.
Moreover, according to Epstein, strong central institutions promoted and provided safety on roads. First, by rising taxation and empowering officials, the state defended the merchants against bandits. Second, by introducing order and clear relations of power, the state prevented armed domestic conflict between regional (war)lords that plighted the medieval period. 5 Third, having an overarching perspective on the domestic trade-network, the central state institutions supported development of intra-regional trade 2 Most wars fought by Poland were an extension of foreign dynastic politics and were related to succession crises (Gierowski 2001) . Moreover, in general, the Polish nobility believed that low military spending would discourage a preventive invasion (Bardach 1957). However, it was the period of weaker capacity in the 17 th and 18 th centuries that featured the most destructive attacks. Similarly, higher state capacity in the 16 th century was also associated with frequent military campaigns (see online appendix). In sum, both weak and strong capacity coincided with interstate warfare. The assumption of exogeneity of the interstate warfare is a strong one. To relax this assumption, in a robustness test, I limit the sample to the years of peace. 3 I assume stable or no costs of feeding the draft animals because these can be fed from the transported grain. 4 North and Weingast (1989) argued that interest rates proxy the quality of institutions. Epstein (2000) demonstrated that the rates formed irrespectively of the type of governance. For simplicity, I assume that, in the short term, the costs of borrowing were driven by the supply of and demand for capital. 5 In the Polish context, these were local armed conflicts between nobles over land (pol. zajazd), that were prevalent in the 17 th and 18 th centuries, i.e. at the time of re-feudalisation and state failure (see the next section; Gierowski 2001).
infrastructure (e.g. building bridges and establishing trade roads) that could not be accomplished by ). In Poland, the strengthening of serfdom in the 17 th and 18 th century, i.e. the lack of legal protection of the peasants by the state against the landlords that resulted in higher rents, is a classical example of this process (Malinowski 2016b) . Lastly, according to Van Zanden et al. 2012 and Elgin et al. (2014) , strong parliaments promoted trade by stabilising the silver content of the currency.
THE CASE OF OLD POLAND
Until 1573, Poland was ruled by hereditary kings. Already in the late middle ages, the prerogatives of the king were gradually limited by a range of privileges given to the nobility, Szlachta, the political ancestors of feudal knights who accounted for around ten percent of the population (Jędruch 1998, p.24) .
In 1355 and 1374, kings Kazimierz and Louis the Hungarian promised not to levy any new taxes without the nobility's consent. This resulted in the creation of only marginal permanent taxes; it also inspired the development of regional representative bodies, Dietines, known as Seymiks, originally assembling to give the required consent to taxation. These evolved into institutions of direct democracy, albeit with no universal franchise, where all male adult nobles who were willing to participate met to make decisions regarding their lands by majority voting. After 1454, when issuing any new laws, not only imposing taxes, kings had to consult the Dietines (Bardach 1957).
The increasingly federal character of the state and the privileges given to the nobility led to the formation of the Seym, to which, from 1468 onwards, the Dietines elected delegates. The oldest historical record of the Seym, composed of the hereditary King, the appointive Senate and elective
House of Delegates, dates back to 1493. After 1505, no law binding the whole country could be passed without the explicit unanimous approval of the three parts of the Seym. It marked the formation of the system of Estate Monarchy, not dissimilar to the one built around the Parliament in England, the Estates General in France, the Cortes in Spain, the Snêm in Bohemia, and the Riksdag in Sweden, with the difference that in many other European countries the rulers retained some legal autonomy and could issue, for example, edicts without the need of the assemblies to legalize all their initiatives. In Poland, the king could only propose and veto legislation. Because he could not rule by decree, the ruler needed the Diet, of which he was an integral part, to exercise influence. The bills agreed on by the House of
Delegates and Senate became legal acts only after the king gave the royal assent to all of them jointly at the end of the Seym's session. Laws agreed on centrally were valid on the local level, however, the principal of regional self-governance allowed the Seymiks to issue their own bylaws next to the central laws. If a session of the Seym ended prematurely, it failed to produce any legally binding acts; in such cases, the Seymiks had to issue their own consent to the issues independently.
In 1572, King Zygmunt the Second died without an heir -this led to a succession crisis. In 1573, it was decided that each new king of Poland (who was also a grand duke of Lithuania) would be elected Van Zanden et al. (2012) proposed to proxy the involvement of an early modern parliament by counting how many days it was in session each year. 7 The authors used this method to study the British Parliament. In the context of most Western European countries that retained the power of the rulers to perform some forms of legal actions independently, parliamentary activity captures the bargaining between the ruler and his subjects. However, in the Polish context where the King, Senate, and House of Delegates were complementaries, parliamentary activity represents the state's capacity to take legal action. Figure 2 shows new data on the number of days between the opening and closing of the Seym's 6 Online appendix is available upon request. 7 Van Zanden et al. (2012) also constructed indexes of activity based on how often a parliament met each century. They set the Polish index at zero because they argued, after Marongiu 1968, p.88 , that the Seym did not meet their definition of a parliament, which was only valid if it represented the cities. As the cities were represented in the Seym, for discussion see Jędruch 1998, p.90 sessions each year. It distinguishes between the conclusive sessions that produced acts and the ones that were discontinued before the royal assent. (Jędruch 1998, p.156) . Termination of the session was therefore largely unrelated to domestic market conditions but was driven by politics.
To illustrate this point, Figure 3 shows that there was no correlation between the duration of the Seym's sessions and the average contemporaneous silver price of rye -an indicator of the market conditions. Moreover, there was no correlation between the duration of the Seym's sessions and the contemporaneous rye price gaps -an indicator of the exchange costs (see online appendix).
Furthermore, Figure 3 also plots the price of grain in the years the sessions were aborted. The results indicate that the sessions were discontinued at any price level. This is confirmed by a binary logistic (logit) regression that does not identify a relationship between the rye price (or the size of the price gap) and the chance of the veto being used (see online appendix). The use of the veto was linked to the constitutional conflict. To demonstrate this, I constructed a royal tenure index ranging from zero in the year the king was elected to 100 in the year he died. For each year, the index equals the ratio of the number of years the king had already been in the office to the total duration of his entire reign (times 100). For example, for the 3 rd year of a ten-year reign (from election till death), the index is 30. Approaching elections rekindled the constitutional conflict and provoked the veto. Figure 3 plots the distribution of all the vetoes and yields that they occurred more often when the royal tenure index was high. A binary logistic (logit) regression identifies that an increase in the index by one point was associated with a significant increase in the chance of the veto being used (see online appendix). In online appendix, I use the royal tenure index to successfully instrument parliamentary activity (compare Jones & Olken 2005) .
The inability of the parliament to conclude many of its sessions led to the petrification of the government. The king could not, as it was to a varying degree in the case in the absolutist countries, as the toll sizes. These courts and commissioners were only active when the parliament was in session (Rybarski 1939) . Therefore, in principle, longer sessions potentially enforced the laws better.
Conversely, termination of its sessions upset the operations of the court and the commissioners. 
1) Uniform taxation
The Seym was of paramount importance for developing a coherent tax policy as it was originally formed to consent to any new taxation. Poland was a domain state with zero-base budgeting and marginal permanent taxes (Filipczak-Kocur 1995) . For this reason, to ensure a stable influx of funds, taxes had to be agreed on repeatedly. Each concluding Seym issued a general tax, uniwersał poborowy, which set general tax rates. In the years when the uniwersał was not published, the king had to approach every Seymik independently to validate the central tax. Different levels of taxation between the lands accepting and refusing the tax increased the exchange costs. Conversely, publishing the uniwersał instantly (next year when the tax was enacted) promoted similar taxation and market integration.
2) Regulation of toll collection
Since 1576, the king was not allowed to levy and regulate tolls without the Seym's consent. When the parliament was active, it frequently issued laws stipulating the punishments for the illegal collection of private tolls (acts of 1589, 1601, 1607) and regulated the exact procedure of farming the relevant incomes (acts of 1538, 1569, 1589, 1736) . Furthermore, in 1601, the Seym regulated how people can appeal from unjustly collected tolls. The lack of parliamentary regulation resulted in less control over tax farmers and encouraged local landlords to create illegal private tolls.
3) Safer roads and better trade infrastructure
The Seym secured the roads by issuing regulation. For example, the acts of 1507 and 1609 instructed the local officials to protect merchants travelling on the official trade routes and punish the criminals who disturbed them. The Seym also commissioned bridges (e.g. acts of 1633 and 1635) and promoted maintenance of roads. For example, in 1539, it instructed that the trade roads had to be clear and wide enough to fit carts and oxen. Moreover, in 1576, to increase access, the Seym stipulated that people travelling to reach a market or a main road via private land could not be stopped or charged a fee.
However, the Seym also set trade routes to the advantage of individual cities. The Diet repeatedly confirmed these privileges (e.g. act of 1649). The laws also stipulated that it was illegal to use roads other than the official trade routes (e.g. act of 1712). This limited freedom; however, clearly defined trade routes arguably allowed the state's officials to protect them.
4) Standardization of measures
The Seym repeatedly instructed the lands to standardise measures (acts of 1550, 1565, 1588, 1598, 1601, 1611, 1616, 1631, and 1635 Nonetheless, the acts incentivised standardisation that was not stimulated otherwise.
5) Access to the grain trade
The landed nobility needed to sell its agricultural produce. It wanted the grain to easily reach ports and cities. Nobles believed it was below their social standing to engage in the trade. To allow the others to move the grain for them, the policies of the Seym consistently supported the free movement of grain (Rybarski 2015) . For example, in 1567, the Seym declared the freedom of trade, i.e. that everyone had a right to trade in every commodity that was already on the territory of the country. In 1576, the Seym prohibited trade monopolies and instructed the king to protect the freedom of the commodity market. In 1565, foreign merchants were granted the protection of the state. This furthered the access.
6) Effective monetary policy
The king was not allowed to issue coin without the Seym's approval. The Seym regulated (a) the official exchange rate between silver and gold, (b) the use of foreign currency (e.g. acts of, 1588, 1598, 1601, 1620, and 1628), and (c) the standard of the Polish coins (e.g. acts of 1564, 1567, and 1569). Table 2 presents the development of the monetary system. Minting privileges were given to individual masters who were expected to hold to the Seym's instructions rather than free-ride on the system by putting less metal into coins than indicated by the official seigniorage. They faced the prisoner dilemma problem, as they did not know if the other mints were also going to uphold the regulations. The silver value of the coins was the highest in the early 16 th century. Polish financial historians identified examples of manipulations of the silver content to the benefit of the mint-masters in the 17 th century. For example, according to Adam Dylewski (2012) , the Seym was too weak to discipline the free-riders and the increase in the number of mints can be interpreted as a sign of handing away rents/personal privileges.
The crisis escalated during the personal union with Saxony in the first half of the 18 th century, when it was decided that Polish money would be minted abroad, in other words, outside the Seym's control. Table 2 shows that the silver content of the currency in Poland dropped much more significantly than in England/Britain that enjoyed a more active Diet. This supports Van Zanden et al. (2012) claim that active parliaments promoted more stable currencies. Moreover, the 16 th century was the period which had the least variation in types of monies, which meant that the policymakers kept the system relatively simple and transparent. The increase in the number of different types of monies in the 17 th century shows the difficulties with balancing the vested interest of different lands eager to use their historical coins (Dylewski 2012) . The issue of the monetary confusion was successfully addressed by the Seym only during its revival in the 1760s.
7) Contract enforcement & 8) 'courts' operations'
Regarding 'contract enforcement', among others, the Seym regulated creditor-lender relations. For example, in 1505, it stipulated that debt obligations without a written contract could be nullified with a testimony. This encouraged formalisation of contracts. In 1540, the Seym decided that merchants had a right to demand repayment of the debts from the nobility. This furthered the equality against the law. In 1543, it stipulated that the debtor cannot postpone repayment of the debt longer than a day in case of a small sum and six weeks in case of a large one. This clarified the exact obligations. Regarding 'courts' operations', the Seym regulated the functioning of the courts and selection of the judges. Without regulation, these policies gravitated towards dissimilar local customs.
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES
Building on the established literature, I assume that markets become more integrated if the exchange costs decrease and prices converge (see Federico 2012) . I link the process to the, so-called, law-of-oneprice that states that price in location 'i' is equal or lower than the price in location 'j' plus the cost of trade between locations 'i' and 'j'. The law-of-one-price is demonstrated by Equation 1:
The law states that any rise in the price gap 'P' between cities 'i' and 'j' above the exchange costs is expected to have been utilised by an instant arbitrage performed by the grain merchants ( Van Bochove 2008; Federico 2012; Malinowski 2016a) . A decrease in the price gap is associated with a decline in the trade costs between the two cities. While price convergence signifies integration, an increase in the price gap should proxy fragmentation (see previous studies that used this intuition in Federico 2012). Using the law as the workhorse of the analysis, I test the hypothesis that legal capacity and regulatory output of the Seym influenced the integration of the domestic market with the use of the regression analysis.
Building directly on the law-of-one-price, I analyse absolute silver price gaps between different city pairs (compare Persson 2004) . In a robustness test, I also study price ratios, an alternative approach to measuring price convergence (e.g. Bateman 2011). 9 I investigate rye, the most traded grain with an unregulated price on the market (Wyczański 1969 ).
The price gap data is based on annual silver prices of 100 litres of rye in six Polish cities:
Gdansk, Warsaw, Cracow, Lublin, Lviv, and Koenigsberg (15 city pairs). I also use a control group of four cities located in The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation: Augsburg, Leipzig, Munich, and Breslau (6 city pairs). These foreign cities were not affected by the Seym but shared similar geographical conditions with the neighbouring Polish cities. This exposed them to the same pan-European trends in prices. The price data has been taken from a compilation of price and wage data made by Malinowski (2016a; 2016c) and Allen (2001) . The information about the dataset is available in online appendix. estimate three linear regression equations based on three empirical strategies: (A) a difference-indifference, (B) a study of annual levels, and (C) an analysis of year-on-year changes -first differences.
9 Poland experienced periods of sustained upward and downward trends in both nominal and silver rye prices (Malinowski 2016c) . Following Table 1 and the logic of the low-of-one-price, the exchange costs are assumed to be independent of the lowest rye price on the market. An increase in rye prices at a time of stable exchange costs would lower the price ratio. To avoid the proxy/measure of the exchange costs being driven by the trends in rye prices I focus the analysis on silver absolute price gaps rather than ratios. The drawback of this method is that the results may be vulnerable to changes in the silver value and shifts in the silver content off the currency. Thus, I control for the CPI and silver content of the currency. As a robustness test, I also look at the price ratios. If identified it proves the studied effect of parliamentary (in)action on market integration. Equation 2 is:
here: ' ' is the intercept; 'i-j' indicates a pair of cities 'i' and 'j'; 't' indicates year; ' , ' the natural logarithm of the absolute silver price gap between a pair of cities 'i-j' in year 't'. I use the logarithm to mitigate the effect of outliers. ' ' is a dummy variable equal one if both 'i' and 'j' are located in Poland and zero if they are located in the Empire (there are no international pairs); ' _1660 ' is a dummy variable equal one if 't' is after 1669 and zero if it is before 1660 (the 1660s are excluded from the analysis); '
, ' is a dummy variable equal one for the records concerning Polish price gaps observed after the 1660s and zero otherwise; ' , ' are control variables; ' ' are time-period dummies/fixed effects; '
' are city-pair dummies/fixed effects (one Polish and one Imperial pair are dropped to avoid collinearity); ' ' is the annual time trend; and ' ' the error-term. The time-period dummies differentiate between six sub-periods -1505-1550, 1551-1600 … 1751-1772 (the first period is dropped to avoid collinearity). The control variables stem from the discussion of the factors relevant for the exchange costs identified in Table 1 , i.e. 'distance', 'differences in language and culture', 'warfare', 'climate', 'wages', 'cost of capital goods', 'interest rates', 'storage', and 'purchasing power of the currency'. City-pair dummies/fixed effects ' ' account for the fixed factors, i.e. 'distance' and 'differences in language and culture'. The control variables ' , ' account for all the exogenous and market factors listed in Table 1 Equations 2 to 4 do not account for the silver value of the currency due to its dependence on state capacity that may result in collinearity (see Table 1 ; changes in the silver value are accounted for in a robustness test). Because the inactivity of the Seym after 1669 should have increased the exchange costs, the hypothesis is that is positive and statistically significant. studies the annual levels of either legal capacity or regulatory output. The logic of the model is that the Seym's actions should only have had an impact on transaction costs within Poland and not in the Empire.
To capture this, I interact the measures of the Seym's activity with the 'POL' dummy. Equation 3 is:
where the variable of interest ' ' is either the legal capacity (Figure 2 ), i.e. parliamentary activity denoted as the number of days the Seym was in session that concluded, or the regulatory output representing the number of areas of economic activity that were regulated in new acts ( Figure 6 ). As regulatory output is a form of parliamentary activity they are never estimated in the same equation.
Equally, because the grain prices come mostly from the first quarter of the year (Adamczyk 1935), so before any session would conclude, and because parliamentary acts needed to be printed, distributed and acknowledged by the Dietines before they could be implemented, Equations 3 (and 4) look at the lag of 'S'. Because the higher activity of the Seym should have lowered the exchange costs, the hypothesis is that is negative and statistically significant. 
This equation is used to study either both the Imperial and Polish or only the Polish city pairs. As in the case of Equation 3, '
' is proxied by either (a) parliamentary activity/legal capacity or (b) regulatory output. I also proxy ' ' with (c) a set of eight dummy variables each capturing the effect of regulating one specific area of regulatory activity (see online appendix). This is estimated by analysing all eight areas both jointly (one regression) and separately (eight regressions). When studying individual regulations, to avoid having to include multiple interaction terms, the sample will be restricted to Poland.
To ensure that price gaps are independent, I analyse only pairs that do not share a city. For
Poland, the main sample of three independent city pairs is Gdansk-Cracow, Koenigsberg-Lviv, and
Warsaw-Lublin. For the Empire, the selected pairs are Munich-Augsburg and Breslau-Leipzig. This selection maximises the number of data points. For robustness, I study all the city pairs (1) jointly, (2) separately, and (3) look at different combinations of independent city pairs (see online appendix). The standard errors are clustered around both the city pairs and individual years. Does the analysis face the problem of endogeneity? As discussed, the use of the liberum veto, the main driver of the volatility of the indexes of parliamentary activity/legal capacity and regulatory output, was related to constitutional and international issues and was not caused by changes in the exchange costs.
The use of a lag of Seym's operations already mitigates the problem as it is unlikely that future exchange costs influenced the past political decisions. Nonetheless, for robustness, I instrument the studied measures of Seym's activity with the exogenous royal tenure index (see online appendix).
Was the relationship between transaction costs and regulation spurious? It is conceivable that a boom in grain output and/or trade, possibly could have, at the same time, both (A) decrease the exchange costs, due to the economies of scale and (B) put pressure on the Seym to regulate the trade, thus creating a spurious relationship between the two. This was not the case. As discussed, Figure 3 demonstrated that the Seym's activity was not dependent on contemporaneous average grain prices -an indicator of market conditions. Moreover, contemporaneous price gaps and the Seym's activity were also not correlated (see online appendix; note Equations 3 and 4 investigate the impact of the lag of the Seym's activity on the price gaps not a contemporaneous relationship). To rule out the possibility of a spurious relationship, Equations 2 to 4 control for the temperature that proxies the grain output. I also perform a robustness test where I control for the volume of grain exports (data: Biernat 1962). Note: OLS regressions. P-values based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. For the selected independent pairs see the text.
RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
1) Difference-in-difference and annual levels specifications (Equations 2 and 3) Specifications VII and VIII conduct a corresponding analysis of the regulatory output. They both identify that the regulatory activity was associated with a decline in the exchange costs and that the acts of the Seym impacted only the Polish market. These two log-level specifications suggest that regulation of each additional area lowered the next year exchange costs by nine or six percent respectively. Since the average session regulated three areas of economic activity, a typical concluding Seym lowered the next year exchange costs by about 27 or 18%. These numbers intend to demonstrate the scale of the effect and may over or underestimate the actual values due to, among others, the measurement error.
The results of this analysis based on levels identifies that both the Seym's activity/legal capacity and regulatory output had a significant effect on lowering the exchange costs on the Polish rye market. Note: OLS regressions. P-values based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. For the selected independent pairs see the text.
2) First differences (Equation 4); individual city pairs and specific areas of regulation Table 5 analyses the year-on-year changes in price gaps. They all control for the full set of control variables. Specification IX analyses all 21 Polish and Imperial city pairs. It identifies that each additional day the Seym was in an unabridged session at time 't-1' lowered the exchange costs between time 't-1' and 't', and that the Seym only impacted the exchange costs within Poland.
Thus far all the samples included the control group of Imperial city pairs. All the subsequent specifications focus the analysis on the first differences of the price gaps between the Polish cities.
Specifications X and XI analyse the impact of Seym's activity/legal capacity at time 't-1'. They analyse all the 15 Polish city pairs and only the three selected independent pairs respectively. They both identify that each additional day in an unabridged session was associated with a subsequent decline in the exchange costs. The size of the effect is comparable with that identified in Specification VI.
Specification XII studies the selected three independent Polish city pairs. It analyses the impact of the Seym's regulatory output and identifies a similar (in size) impact as Specifications VII and VIII that investigate levels. output in the previous year and the year-on-year decline in the exchange costs was consistent across the city pairs. The seemingly unrelated regression procedure identifies that, for both activity and output, these individual coefficients are jointly statistically different to zero (P-value 0.00).
The index of regulatory output groups eight different areas of regulation. I also study the individual impact of regulating each area of regulation. I study eight dummy variables, each equal one if the corresponding area was regulated by at least one new act and zero otherwise (see online appendix).
I use Equation 4 to analyse the impact of regulating each area separately (eight regressions). I also analyse the eight series jointly with one regression. I base this analysis on the sample of three independent Polish city pairs. This selection and the first-differences specification combined ensure that the price gap data are independent both across pairs and years. Figure 9 shows the results of the analysis. The separate one-by-one analysis of the specific areas of regulation (eight regressions) indicates that regulation of all the areas besides 'infrastructure' and 'court's operations' had a statistically significant and negative effect. However, because every concluding session of the Seym issued the general tax, it is useful to disentangle the impacts of different types of regulation. Figure 9 shows the result of a regression specification that accounts for all the types of regulation (one regression). This specification identifies that regulation of the 'general tax', 'measures', and 'court's operations' were associated with a decline in the exchange costs on the rye market. The combined evidence from both the separate and joint studies of different regulations suggests that the Polish state supported the formation of an integrated domestic market, at least, by enforcing uniform taxation levels and fostering standardisation of measures.
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3) Robustness tests
Specifications XIII to XVII in Table 5 perform several robustness tests. They are based on the firstdifferences specification and study the three independent Polish city pairs. This ensures that the price gap data are independent both across pairs and years. Specification XIII tests if the substitution of 'Parliamentary activity (lag)' for '∆Parliamentary activity (lag)' affects the results. I identify that a change in the number of days the Seym was in session between 't-2' and 't-1' impacted the change in the exchange costs between 't-1' and 't'. Specification XIV controls for the silver content of the currency and the size of the grain exports. It identifies a statistically significant impact of legal capacity.
Specification XV addresses the issue that, due to the long periods of parliamentary inactivity, the Seym's activity was disproportionally often equal zero. It restricts the sample to the years directly after concluding sessions (the Seym met and concluded at 't-1'). It identifies the effect of interest.
Specification XVI studies changes in price ratios (higher price divided by lower price) rather than the absolute price gaps. It also identifies the effect of interest. Lastly, the war casualties measure does not account for the exact locations of military conflicts that may affect the city pairs differently. To mitigate this problem, Specification XVII narrows the sample to the years that both 't' and 't-1' were the years of peace. Additional robustness tests are available in online appendix. This includes a test that accounts for the direction of warfare, as well as, a set of 2SLS regressions with the index of royal tenure used as an exogenous instrument. All the results identify that state failure had a negative effect on market integration while an active parliament fostered the development of an integrated domestic market.
CONCLUSION
Economic history's literature on the role of the state in the long-term economic development of preindustrial Europe is divided into two opposing streams. The first argues that constraining governments helped avoid harmful predation, while the second demonstrates that strong governments often played a crucial role in setting up institutions crucial for well-operating markets. These two points of view rarely speak to one another. The case of the British Glorious Revolution led to the conventional knowledge that, in principle, constraining the ruler should promote economic growth. The Polish case problematizes this by demonstrating that constraining the monarch had negative political and economic consequences. The Polish king had too few prerogatives to oppose centrifugal forces and bind the country together in the absence of a well-functioning parliament. The power vacuum was filled by regional lords that effectively divided the country into various zones of influence. Inter alia, the lack of control allowed them to raise tenurial rents and sharpen serfdom in the country. This demonstrates that limiting the king and forming a parliamentary regime was not a sufficient condition to initiate sustainable economic growth; it at least had to be accompanied by mechanisms preventing the regional elites from hijacking the extractive power.
Initially, in the 16 th century, this was ensured by a central territorial parliament representing the interest of the landed nobility. The Seym favoured the lowering of transaction costs on the grain market to allow the nobility to export the grain cheaply. To this end, the Seym issued numerous regulations that harmonised economic institutions and fostered market integration. However, the constitutional conflict, foreign intervention, and the particular interest of the richest of the nobles, magnates, to ensure their unsupervised regional influence gradually broke the Seym and resulted in political fragmentation (possibly even re-feudalisation) that eventually led to market fragmentation.
Moreover, the findings suggest that the market economy does not form spontaneously but To prove this hypothesis, one would have to develop standardised and comparable proxies of market integration and legal capacity of the state. There have been few attempts to conduct crosssectional studies of market development across early-modern Europe, but they suffer from the problem of standardisation (Federico 2012) . Regarding measuring legal capacity, Van Zanden et al. (2012) constructed the index of parliamentary activity for a range of European countries. However, because the power in the West was often exercised by both the ruler and the representative institutions, a coherent picture also requires inexistent systematic accounts of the legal action of the rulers. Preindustrial Poland, due to the unique complementarity of its political institutions, provides a valuable insight into the relationship between states and markets, but much remains to be done to fully understand the road historical European states took to develop their domestic markets and promote economic growth.
